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Abstract. We propose a formal framework to support belief revision based on a
cognitive model of credibility and trust. In this framework, the acceptance of in-
formation coming from a source depends on (i) the agent’s goals and beliefs about
the source’s goals, (ii) the credibility, for the agent, of incoming information, and
(iii) the agent’s beliefs about the context in which it operates. This makes it pos-
sible to approach belief revision in a setting where new incoming information is
associated with an acceptance degree. In particular, such degree may be used as
input weight for any possibilistic conditioning operator with uncertain input (i.e.,
weighted belief revision operator).
1 Introduction
Fulfilling its goals is an important concern for an agent. The agent’s perceptions about
its environment highly influences this process. Such perceptions dynamically enrich the
agent’s beliefs, namely thanks to new more or less credible/trusted information. Accord-
ing to the principle of primacy update, in belief revision new information is generally
accepted. However, as pointed out by several authors [10, 11, 13], in real-world situ-
ations it is often the case that new information is not fully considered or simply not
accepted due to an insufficient amount of plausibility [5]. The extent to which new in-
formation will be accepted (i.e., really considered) by the agent directly depends on
these credibility and trust values. A key factor for the agent’s success in fulfilling its
goals is then its ability to compute both the credibility of new information and its trust
in the source providing information. Recently, Adali [1] has proposed to define infor-
mation trust as a computational concept whose value depends on the trustworthiness
of the information source,1 and on the credibility of the information content. Adali’s
approach also agrees with the one proposed by Sparks [26]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, a formal framework for measuring the acceptability of a message which
takes into account the agent’s goals and the agent’s beliefs about the source’s goals, the
credibility of the message with respect to its content and with respect to both the agent’s
competence and the source’s competence, and the agent’s beliefs about the source’s na-
ture (malicious or not) is still missing.
The research question of how to provide such a framework breaks down into the
following subquestions:
1 In the rest of the paper we will also refer to the “trustworthiness of an information source” for
an agent as the agent’s “trust in a source”.
– How do we take the nature of the information source into account?
– How do we take the agent’s and source’s goals into account?
– How do we measure the credibility of information based on the agent’s and the
source’s competences?
We answer these questions by proposing a possibilistic model whereby the cognitive
notions of trust and credibility can be formalized and the acceptability of the pieces of
information can be computed. Our framework makes it possible to:
– represent the fact that the agent’s beliefs may include the “nature” of a source,
which may be categorized as malicious, rational, etc.—each evaluation of a com-
ponent of trust should consider this fact;
– somehow measure the source’s willingness to cooperate thanks to the agent’s per-
ceptions about the source’s goals—a source sharing my goals should (implicitly
or explicitly) act/help for the achievement of these goals, unless, perhaps, it is not
rational;
– compute the credibility of information coming from a given source with respect to:
• the agent’s competence—the agent may be able to evaluate the information
content regardless of how trustworthy it considers the information source;
• the source’s competence—we suppose that (1) each piece of information be-
longs to a domain of competence and (2) the agent has beliefs about the do-
mains of competence of the sources. It is then possible to evaluate the credibil-
ity of such a new piece of information with respect to the source’s competence;
Our approach is cast within the framework of possibility theory in order to cover
cases when not enough data to compute probabilities are available.
The paper is organized as follows: first, we present some related work and we com-
pare them to the proposed approach. Then, we provide some basic notions of possibility
theory, upon which our model is built. Our proposal is put forth in Section 4, and its
formal properties are discussed. Conclusions end the paper.
2 Related Work
In multi-agent systems, representing and making possible the evaluation of the credi-
bility associated with a piece of information is important especially when the agents
have their own beliefs and can obtain new information from other sources. In this case,
assessing to which extent such new information should be integrated with the agents’
beliefs depends on its credibility and on the trustworthiness of its source. Tamargo et
al. [27] address this problem in a collaborative multi-agent system in which agents can
receive new information from informant agents through communication. The authors
consider a credibility order among the informant agents. A belief is then revised when
new contradictory incoming information arrives from an informant that is highly cred-
ible. Unlike in Tamargo’s approach, where credibility is associated to agents, here we
propose to associate a (computed) credibility degree to the new piece of information.
Kru¨mpelmann et al. [14] propose to attach an agent identifier to each piece of in-
formation, representing the credibility of the transferred information. But still, credi-
bility is associated to an agent. Besides, while our value of credibility together with
the trust value will determine the extent to which the new piece of information will
be accepted, in the above-mentioned approaches the aim of the credibility order is to
help in the choice of which, of the old belief and the new piece of information, will be
adopted/maintained.
On the other hand, there exist several works about trust in the literature and in dif-
ferent disciplines [19,20,26,31]. Among the numerous and interesting contributions by
Falcone et al., we can underline [12], in which the authors claim that an agent’s deci-
sion about trusting an information source or not depends on the agent’s representation
of the source’s nature. The principle according to which “only an agent endowed with
goals and beliefs can trust another agent” has been pointed out by Castelfranchi and
Falcone [7]. Trust is thus considered as a matter of utility and a context-sensitive con-
cept. All the above proposals lead us to argue that trust is a multidimensional concept.
Sabater et al. [23] share this point of view. Indeed, they proposed a model which deals
with three dimensions of trust or reputation. The first dimension is based on an agent’s
own experiences. The second dimension is based on third-party information obtained
thanks to the agent’s social relationships, and the third dimension, also called the onto-
logical dimension, helps to transfer trust information between related contexts. Sierra
and Debenham [25] propose a trust-based decision model to be used in the context of
negotiation. They propose a probabilistic method to represent and define trust as de-
pending on the information gain caused by a piece of evidence—the more information
an agent has about an event, the smaller its (probabilistic) uncertainty about that event.
Probability theory is also used by Teacy et al. [28] to represent trust by taking past
interactions with other agents into account while possibility theory is used in [2] for
proposing an interval-based representations of trust and distrust based on past perfor-
mances by considering the fact that data are not necessarily numerous in practice.
3 Background
In this section, we provide basic notions of possibility theory and define how beliefs and
goals are formalized in our framework to model cognitive agents. Finally, we propose
a way to associate the information content of a message to domains of competence, by
adopting implication in logical Information Retrieval models.
3.1 Language and Interpretations
A classical propositional language may be used to represent information for manipula-
tion by a cognitive agent.
Definition 1. (Language) Let Prop be a finite set of atomic propositions and let L be
the propositional language such that Prop ∪ {>,⊥} ⊆ L, and, ∀φ, ψ ∈ L, ¬φ ∈ L,
φ ∧ ψ ∈ L, φ ∨ ψ ∈ L.
As usual, one may define additional logical connectives and consider them as useful
shorthands for combinations of connectives of L, e.g., φ ⊃ ψ ≡ ¬φ∨ψ. We will denote
by Ω = {0, 1}Prop the set of all interpretations on Prop. An interpretation I ∈ Ω is
a function I : Prop → {0, 1} assigning a truth value pI to every atomic proposition
p ∈ Prop and, by extension, a truth value φI to all formulas φ ∈ L.2 We will denote by
[φ] the set of all models of φ, [φ] = {I : I |= φ}.
3.2 Possibility Theory
Fuzzy sets [32] are sets whose elements have degrees of membership in [0, 1]. Possibil-
ity theory is a mathematical theory of uncertainty that relies upon fuzzy set theory, in
that the (fuzzy) set of possible values for a variable of interest is used to describe the un-
certainty as to its precise value. At the semantic level, the membership function of such
set, pi, is called a possibility distribution and its range is [0, 1]. A possibility distribution
can represent the beliefs of an agent: pi(I) represents the degree of compatibility of the
interpretation I with the available evidence about the real world if we are representing
uncertain beliefs. By convention, pi(I) = 1 means that it is totally possible for I to be
the real world, 1 > pi(I) > 0 means that I is only somehow possible, while pi(I) = 0
means that I is certainly not the real world.
A possibility distribution pi is said to be normalized if there exists at least one in-
terpretation I0 s.t. pi(I0) = 1, i.e., there exists at least one possible situation which is
consistent with the available knowledge.
Definition 2 (Fuzzy Measure). Let Ω be a universe of discourse; a function f : 2Ω →
[0, 1] is a fuzzy measure if
1. f(∅) = 0;
2. for all A,B ⊆ Ω, A ⊆ B ⇒ f(A) ≤ f(B).
A fuzzy measure f is normalized if f(Ω) = 1.
Definition 3 (Possibility and Necessity Measures). A possibility distribution pi in-
duces a possibility measure and its dual necessity measure, denoted by Π and N re-
spectively. Both measures apply to a classical set S ⊆ Ω and are defined as follows:
Π(S) = max
I∈S
pi(I); (1)
N(S) = 1−Π(S¯) = min
I∈S¯
{1− pi(I)}. (2)
A few properties of Π and N induced by a normalized possibility distribution on a
finite universe of discourse Ω are the following. For all subsets S ⊆ Ω:
1. Π(A ∪B) = max{Π(A), Π(B)}; N(A ∩B) = min{N(A), N(B)};
2. Π(A ∩B) ≤ min{Π(A), Π(B)}; N(A ∪B) ≥ max{N(A), N(B)};
3. Π(∅) = N(∅) = 0; Π(Ω) = N(Ω) = 1;
4. Π(S) = 1−N(S¯) (duality);
5. N(S) > 0⇒ Π(S) = 1; Π(S) < 1⇒ N(S) = 0;
In case of complete ignorance on S, Π(S) = Π(S¯) = 1 and N(S) = N(S¯) = 0.
2 When φI = 1, i.e., I satisfies formula φ, in symbols I |= φ, I is called a model of φ.
3.3 Beliefs
We assume a possibilistic BDI model of agency like the one proposed in [9]. In that
model, the epistemic state of an agent is represented by a normalized possibility distri-
bution pi : Ω → [0, 1]. The degree to which a given arbitrary formula φ ∈ L is believed
can, therefore, be calculated from it as
B(φ) = N([φ]) = 1−max
I6|=φ
{pi(I)}. (3)
Straightforward consequences of the properties of possibility and necessity measures
are that B(φ) > 0 ⇒ B(¬φ) = 0, i.e., if the agent somehow believes φ then it cannot
believe ¬φ at all;B(φ∧ψ) = min{B(φ),B(ψ)} andB(φ∨ψ) ≥ max{B(φ),B(ψ)}.
Notice that B(>) = 1 and B(⊥) = 0.
The rationale for choosing possibility theory to represent beliefs is its ability to cap-
ture epistemic uncertainty. It is well known that possibility theory is suited to represent
uncertainty by only using a notion of order (much easier to have with few data) between
the possible outcomes. A viable alternative would be the Dempster-Shafer theory of ev-
idence [24]; however, the use of that theory would be computationally much heavier,
due to the need to maintain a probability mass assignment to every element of 2Ω , as
compared to a possibility assignment to every interpretation of Ω in possibility theory.
3.4 Goals
The goals of an agent may be represented as a setG of formulas from the same language
L. The meaning of saying that ψ ∈ G is a goal for the agent is that the agent would be
happy with any state of the world I ∈ Ω such that I |= ψ.
3.5 Domains of Competence
We propose to associate formulas to domains of competence. This is in line with what
has been proposed by Paglieri et al. [18], except that they referred to arguments instead
of just formulas and they defined domains based on the propositions their truth depends
on. We propose a more general definition inspired by the use of implication in logical
Information Retrieval models [30]. More precisely, given a domain d described by a
formula χd (like a query in (fuzzy) set-based models of information retrieval) and a
formula φ (like a document), we use implication to determine if φ is relevant to d i.e.,
if χd |= φ. The intuitive meaning of this is that incoming information is relevant to a
domain if the models of the formula describing the domain are included in the models
of the formula describing incoming information. However, because entailment is too
rigid a relation and cannot express partial relevance [15], what we propose is in line
with fuzzy set-based models in Information retrieval [29], where one resorts to a fuzzy
measure of the χd |= φ entailment. We define one such measure based on possibilistic
conditioning [4] of φ by χd.
Definition 4. Given language L and D the set of domains of competence, such that
every d ∈ D is defined by a formula χd ∈ L, the association between formulas and
domains is represented by a fuzzy relation R : L ×D → [0, 1] such that, given φ ∈ L,
d ∈ D, the membership degree of formula φ in domain d is
R(φ, d) =
{
1, if χd |= φ,
Π([φ ∧ χd]), otherwise.
In addition, we may require that the domains D form a partition of the universe of
discourse, i.e., that ∨
d∈D
χd = >, ∀d1, d2 ∈ D,χd1 ∧ χd2 = ⊥.
Proposition 1. Let φ, ψ ∈ L. For all domain d ∈ D, if φ |= ψ, R(φ, d) ≤ R(ψ, d).
Proof: Given a domain d, we may distinguish three cases:
1. χd |= φ; in this case, it must also be that χd |= ψ and, as a consequence,R(φ, d) =
R(ψ, d) = 1, and the thesis holds;
2. χd 6|= φ and χd |= ψ; in this case, R(φ, d) = Π([φ ∧ χd]) ≤ 1 and R(ψ, d) = 1,
and the thesis holds;
3. χd 6|= φ and χd 6|= ψ; in this case, R(φ, d) = Π([φ ∧ χd]) and R(ψ, d) = Π([ψ ∧
χd]); now, φ |= ψ means [φ] ⊆ [ψ]; therefore, [φ] ∩ [χd] ⊆ [ψ] ∩ [χd], hence
Π([φ ∧ χd]) ≤ Π([ψ ∧ χd]), and the thesis holds.
2
4 A Formal Framework of Cognitive Trust
We are now ready to formalize the notion of trust, the nature of an information source,
the relation between beliefs and goals, and credibility.
4.1 Trust as Belief
Some pieces of information can contribute to increase or decrease the trust that an agent
has in a source, and others can contribute to increase or decrease distrust. Trust is also
a matter of competences.3 Indeed, we can have different evaluations of trust (distrust)
in the same source relevant to different domains of competence.
Like in [17], we suppose that trust and distrust are not the opposite ends of a single
continuum, but linked dimensions that can coexist and have different antecedents and
consequences [20]. We consider the social-cognitive model of trust [7, 22], in which
trust is defined as beliefs: an agent trusts a source s, in a domain d, if and only if it
somehow believes that s will be able to somehow help it fulfill its goals. We will also
define distrust as a belief: an agent distrusts a source s with respect to a domain of
competence d if and only if it somehow believes that s might try to prevent it to reach
its goals. Although in the next sections we will show how to compute trust and distrust
3 Here, we name such a competence-based trust credibility.
in a source s, we should always keep in mind that trust and distrust in s are to be
construed conceptually as if they were defined as follows:
trust(s) ≡ B(“s is trustworthy”), (4)
distrust(s) ≡ B(“s is untrustworthy”). (5)
Notice that proposition “s is untrustworthy” is the logical negation of “s is trustworthy”.
Some authors treat “distrust” as if it were defined as ¬B(“s is trustworthy”), in
which case distrust(s) = 1 − trust(s): trust is considered as the complement of dis-
trust [31]. Here, we give distrust a stronger meaning: we distrust someone if we have
valid reasons to believe he is lying, not if we do not have valid reasons to believe he is
telling the truth. In other words, distrust is not the complement of trust.
A consequence of Equations 4 and 5, together with the properties of Π and N , is
that trust and distrust, wrt a given domain, obey the following mutual constraints:
trust(s) > 0⇒ distrust(s) = 0, (6)
distrust(s) > 0⇒ trust(s) = 0. (7)
In case of total ignorance, we have that trust(s) = distrust(s) = 0. Notice that if
we consider trust as the complement of distrust, we cannot represent the situations of
total ignorance in which the agent does not know anything which could lead it to trust
or distrust the source; distrust(s) = 1− trust(s) = 0.5 would not mean ignorance!
4.2 The Nature of a Source
Any judgment about the competence or willingness of a source to provide useful in-
formation must be, implicitly or explicitly, based on an agent’s judgment (i.e., be-
liefs) about the source according to past interactions as well as recommendations or
the source’s reputations. We will refer to such assessment as the source’s nature.
Without any claim of exhaustiveness and just to ground our presentation on an in-
tuitive setting, we draw inspiration from the abstract model of a human agent’s social
behavior proposed by Italian economist Carlo Cipolla [8] as the backdrop on which his
theory of human stupidity is expounded.
According to Cipolla’s model, an agent’s behavior may be summarized by two co-
ordinates:
x the average gain (or loss) that an agent obtains as a result of his or her actions;
y the average gain (or loss) that an agent produces to other agents or groups of agents.
As a result, agents can be plotted as points on a diagram like the one shown in Figure 1
based on their 〈x, y〉 behavior. Such a diagram divides the two-dimensional plane into
four quadrants or eight sectors, corresponding to different natures of the agents.
For the sake of simplicity, let us represent an agent’s position in one of the eight
sectors by means of three propositional variables: r if agent s is rational (x > 0); m if
agent s is malicious (y < 0); and e if |y| < |x|.
It is worth mentioning that this concept of source nature allows us to model the
two kinds of beliefs, namely “willingness belief” and “persistence belief”, proposed by
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Fig. 1. The correspondence between the eight sectors of the source nature diagram and the truth
assignments to the propositional variables r, m, and e.
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Legend: the agent’s goals [G] the source’s goals [Gs]
Fig. 2. A schematic illustration of the four cases of agent’s goal-source’goals relationships.
Ramchurn [21] to ensure that a certain task can be delegated by an agent to another
one. More precisely, the eight sectors we identify are used by the agent to decide when
it needs to maintain a suspicious attitude in dealing with malicious or irrational agents.
4.3 Trust and (Shareable) Goals
We make the assumption that the agent’s beliefs about the source’s goals may also
influence its trust in the source. Indeed, regardless of the content of information, if, for
example, a source s shares the same goal g with the agent, we may suppose that s will
act to fulfill g. This should, at least in case of rational sources, prevent s from taking
actions that could negatively influence the satisfaction of g.
The way beliefs about the source’s goals,Gs are taken into account is by comparing
them with the agent’s own goals, G. We distinguish four cases, which represent three
possible situations. The four cases are schematically illustrated in Figure 2.
(a) [Gs] ⊆ [G] or, equivalently, Gs |= G: if the source achieves its goals, the agent
does too (necessary help).
(b) [Gs]∩ [G] 6= ∅ and [Gs]∩ [G] 6= ∅: the agent’s and the source’s goals are indepen-
dent: the fact that either of the two achieves its goals does not necessarily imply or
exclude that the other does; there is thus room for cooperation (compatibility).
(c) [Gs]∩ [G] = ∅: there is an overt conflict between the agent’s and the source’s goals
(conflict).
(d) [G] ⊂ [Gs] or, equivalently, G |= Gs: if the agent achieves its goals, the source
does too, but not vice versa (compatibility).
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Fig. 3. A definition of functions τz(I) and δz(I), for z ∈ {a, b, c, d} and I ∈ {0, 1}{r,m,s}.
4.4 Trust in a Source
We assume that an agent has an internal reasoning mechanism allowing it to compute
the trust/distrust, τz/δz , with z ∈ {(a), (b), (c), (d)} (the four cases in Section 4.3).
Such degrees depend on the agent’s beliefs about the source’s position in the nature
diagram and its beliefs about the source’s goals with respect to its own goals. Figure 3
shows a minimal such mechanism based on look-up tables.
Computing trust can be seen as a set of material implications. Given a source’s po-
sition in the nature diagram, “if the source’s goals configuration is z, then the agent
will associate a trust τz to that source”. However, the agent may not know precisely
the source’s position and it can just have a notion of order about which among the
eight possible sectors the source could be in, some of them being more possible than
others. If we consider a source s, the uncertainty is captured in our formalism trough
the possibility distribution on the worlds (i.e., interpretations) I which are consistent
with {0, 1}{rs,ms,es}. The above implication is then represented as a fuzzy implication.
Among the existing definitions of fuzzy implications (see for example [16] for a survey)
we adopt the Kleene-Dienes fuzzy implication. Other definitions might be used as well.
The truth value of the fuzzy implication “If a source is somehow compatible with situ-
ation I, then the agent trusts that source to degree τz(I)” quantifies to what extent “the
agent trusts that source to degree τz(I)” is at least as true as “that source is somehow
compatible with situation I”. Let us recall that we consider eight possible positions
and that we have a possibility distribution on these positions. We have then eight fuzzy
implications with their respective truth values. Therefore, for each goal configuration z,
we define the trust and distrust that the agent has in source s as follows:4
trustz(s) = minI∈{0,1}{rs,ms,es}
max{τz(I), 1− pi(I)}, (8)
distrustz(s) = minI∈{0,1}{rs,ms,es}
max{δz(I), 1− pi(I)}. (9)
4 For the the sake of readability, we restrict the interpretations I as if the language were built on
atomic propositions rs, ms, and es only.
Besides, we can also have uncertainty about the configuration of the source’s goals.
The overall trust/distrust of an agent in a source s depends then on (i) its judgment about
a source defined by τz/δz , (ii) the uncertainty about the source’s real nature, and (iii)
the uncertainty about the source’s goals. We thus define these trust and distrust values
based on goals and nature as follows:
trust(s) = min
z∈{a,b,c,d}
max{trustz(s), 1− pi(z)}, (10)
distrust(s) = min
z∈{a,b,c,d}
max{distrustz(s), 1− pi(z)}. (11)
Proposition 2. If the two functions τz(I) and δz(I) are such that, for all z and I,
τz(I) > 0 ⇒ δz(I) = 0 and δz(I) > 0 ⇒ τz(I) = 0, then, for all source s, trust(s)
and distrust(s) satisfy the bipolar conditions of Equations 6 and 7.
Proof: Since pi is normalized, ∃z0, I0 such that pi(z0) = pi(I0) = 1. Then, trust(s) >
0 ⇒ ∀z max{trustz(s), 1 − pi(z)} > 0 ⇒ trustz0(s) > 0 ⇒ τz0(I0) > 0 ⇒
δz0(I0) = 0 and 1− pi(I0) = 0⇒ max{δz0(I0), 1− pi(I0)} = 0⇒ distrust(s) = 0.
A similar reasoning proves that distrust(s) > 0⇒ trust(s) = 0. 2
A corollary of this proposition is that, for all source s, trust(s) + distrust(s) ≤ 1.
We can notice that, in case of complete ignorance, trust(s) = distrust(s) = 0.
Definition 5. (Trustworthiness order relation) Let s1 and s2 be two information sources.
We consider that s1 is less trustworthy than s2, s1  s2, if and only if trust(s1) ≤
trust(s2) and distrust(s1) ≥ distrust(s2).
Proposition 3. (Total order) The relation  is a total order.
Proof: The thesis is a direct consequence of Equations 6 and 7. 2
4.5 Credibility and Competence
Let D be the set of domains of competence considered for the agent and the sources.
The agent’s competences are represented through a vector κ, whose component κd
represents the extent to which the agent is competent with respect to domain d ∈ D.
Moreover, we suppose that the agent may have beliefs about the competences of a
source. To this aim, we assume that Prop contains propositions csd, meaning “source s
is competent about domain d”;B(csd) will thus be the extent to which the agent believes
s is competent about d.
Definition 6. Let φ 6≡ ⊥ be new information provided by s. The extent to which the
agent deems φ credible, given that φ is reported by source s, is
cr(φ, s) = max{B(φ),max
d∈D
min{crd(φ, s), R(φ, d)}}, (12)
where
crd(φ, s) =
{
min{B(csd), 1− κd, Π([φ])}, if κd > B(csd);
B(csd), otherwise.
(13)
For the sake of completeness, ∀s, cr(⊥, s) = 0.
Equation 12 may be paraphrased as ”φ being reported by s is credible if there exists a
domain to which φ is related and with respect to which it is credible”. Taking a max with
B(φ) accounts for the fact that the extent to which something is believable cannot be
less than it is already believed, no matter which source is reporting it, since credibility is
the quality of being believable. Besides, a message is believable if we deem it possible.
Formally, for all formula φ provided by a source s we haveB(φ) ≤ cr(φ, s) ≤ Π([φ]).
This definition of credibility allows us to capture the notion of “competence belief” pro-
posed in [21], going even further by using both the receiving agent’s own competence
and the source’s expected competences to assess the credibility of the information item.
Equation 13 involves two cases:
– if the agent is not more competent about d than the source is (κd ≤ B(csd), second
case of Equation 13), then it will not try to filter the incoming message according
to its own beliefs; this is a mandatory assumption if an agent is to be capable of
learning from sources it believes to be more knowledgeable than it is;
– if, however, the agent believes to be more competent about d than the source
(κd > B(csd), first case of Equation 13), information supplied by the source should
be evaluated by its internal credibility; in addition, the resulting credibility of sup-
plied information should not be greater than the competence of the source pro-
viding it, otherwise an agent scarcely competent about a domain would incur the
risk of accepting acritically anything that a source just a little more competent than
it about that domain would say, which is not in conflict with its (admittedly very
incomplete) beliefs.
Furthermore, the first case in Equation 13 refers to an “internal” credibility of φ, which
satisfies the following two intuitive properties:
1. if φ is completely relevant to d, crd(φ) ≤ 1−B(¬φ);
2. the more the agent’s knowledge is complete on domain d (i.e., the agent is com-
petent), the more crd(φ) will approach its lower bound B(φ) and, vice versa, the
more the agent is ignorant about d, the more it must be keen on heeding a φ that
does not contradict its current beliefs.
Like in [6], for example, the idea here is to capture the fact that a piece of informa-
tion is accepted by the agent if and only if it is “credible” for the agent. “Our definition”
of credibility is nevertheless different from the one used by Booth et al.. They consider
the set of credible formulas as “an (explicit) part of an epistemic state, since it defines
how easily an agent can accept very implausible new pieces of information”. In our
setting, the credibility of a piece of information represents the capability of the agent to
evaluate the tenability of the piece of information with respect to its own competences
and the ones of the sources. Obviously, if the agent is less competent or not competent
at all with respect to a domain, this credibility degree must depend (be weighted), in a
sense, by the source’s competence.
Proposition 4. Given a source s, cr(·, s) is a normalized fuzzy measure.
Proof: We must prove that cr(⊥, s) = 0; cr(>, s) = 1; and ∀φ, ψ ∈ L, φ |= ψ ⇒
cr(φ, s) ≤ cr(ψ, s) (monotonicity). Now, cr(⊥, s) = 0 holds by definition; cr(>, s) =
1 holds because cr(>, s) = max{B(>),maxd∈D min{crd(>, s), R(>, d)}} ≥ B(>) =
1. To prove monotonicity, we observe that, for every domain d ∈ D,
– B(φ) ≤ B(ψ), because B is a fuzzy measure;
– R(φ, d) ≤ R(ψ, d) by Proposition 1;
– Π([φ]) ≤ Π([ψ]), because Π is a fuzzy measure;
– B(csd) and κd do not depend on φ or ψ.
Therefore, since max{a, b} ≤ max{c, d} and min{a, b} ≤ min{c, d} if a ≤ c and
b ≤ d, cr(φ, s) ≤ cr(ψ, s). 2
Being the credibility cr(·, s) in an information content provided by a certain source
a fuzzy measure, the following two properties hold:
Proposition 5. Given a source s, ∀φ, ψ ∈ L, cr(φ ∨ ψ, s) ≥ max(cr(ψ, s), cr(ψ, s))
and cr(φ ∧ ψ, s) ≤ min(cr(ψ, s), cr(ψ, s)).
Proof: ∀φ, ψ ∈ L, (a) φ |= φ∨ψ, and ψ |= φ∨ψ; therefore, cr(φ, s) ≤ cr(φ∨ψ, s) and
cr(ψ, s) ≤ cr(φ∨ψ, s); (b) φ∧ψ |= φ and φ∧ψ |= ψ; therefore, cr(φ∧ψ, s) ≤ cr(φ, s)
and cr(φ ∧ ψ, s) ≤ cr(ψ, s). 2
4.6 Accepting Information
The extent to which a piece of information φ (provided by a source s) is accepted by an
agent depends on the trust and distrust computed on the basis of the source’s goals and
nature (Equations 10 and 11) and the credibility of φ for the agent (Equation 12) which
depends on the competences of the agent and the sources. We may be combined these
values using the minimum triangular norm, to yield the extent to which φ provided by
s is accepted by the agent:
acc(φ, s) = min{cr(φ, s), trust(s)}. (14)
The choice of min as the aggregation operator is motivated by the fact that an agent
should accept information φ provided by source s to the extent to which it deems φ
credible and s trustworthy according to its goals and nature.
Proposition 6. ∀s, acc(·, s) is a fuzzy measure. It is normalized if trust(s) = 1.
Proof: Since acc(·, s) is the min of a normalized fuzzy measure and trust(s), which
is a constant for a fixed s, acc(·, s) is a fuzzy measure, i.e., acc(⊥, s) = 0 and, for
φ, ψ ∈ L such that φ |= ψ,
acc(φ, s) = min{cr(φ, s), trust(s)} ≤ min{cr(ψ, s), trust(s)} = acc(ψ, s).
Finally, if trust(s) = 1, acc(>, s) = min{cr(>, s), 1} = min{1, 1} = 1. 2
A piece of information φ may be provided by more sources. In this case, the extent
to which φ is accepted by the agent, accepted(φ) may be defined as
accepted(φ) = max
s∈src(φ)
{acc(φ, s)}, (15)
where src(φ) denotes the sources of φ. Operators other than max might be used, e.g.,
operators with cumulative effects. The value accepted(φ) may be used as input weight
for any weighted belief revision operator, like the ones studied in [3].
Experimental results obtained by Sparks in [26] shows that when untrustworthy
sources provide non-credible information, individuals are less likely to revise their ini-
tial beliefs. Our formalism also captures the fact that the initial beliefs of an agent are
not revised if new information is non-credible or is provided by untrustworthy sources.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to shed some light on a few fundamental formal aspects of
credibility and trust as used by humans in view of their implementation on computers.
More precisely, our contribution consists in providing a model for computing the accep-
tance of information provided by a source taking into account both trust in the source
and credibility of the message.
Our model encompasses, but is not limited to, the four “kinds” of beliefs needed by
an agent before delegating a task to another agent [21], where the task is “to provide
useful information”. In particular,
– “competence belief” is captured by “our” definition of credibility that goes even
further by using also the receiving agent’s own competence to assess information
provided by another agent;
– “willingness belief” and “persistence belief” are captured thanks to the concept of
“source nature”: we should always adopt and maintain a suspicious attitude with
respect to an agent we believe to be irrational for example; and
– “motivation belief” is captured by taking into account both the goals of the agent
and the ones of the source: the agent believes that a source sharing its goals has
some motivation to help it.
As for future work, we plan to apply our formalism towards a cognitive view of
adversarial reasoning, and to analyze and reason over irrational behavior (i.e., stupid
agents are dangerous because they act irrationally).
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